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CONDITIONAL SURRENDER
Conflict Termination in the Pacific, 1945
Richard J. Shuster and Takuya Shimodaira

Should we continue to fight, it would not only result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to
the total extinction of human civilization.

W

EMPEROR HIROHITO, 15 AUGUST 1945

ith the statement above, Emperor Hirohito announced to his people that
Japan had accepted the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, bringing to
an end the savage fighting in the Pacific. Two weeks later aboard the battleship
USS Missouri, as General Douglas MacArthur, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, and
a host of other senior Allied leaders looked on stoically, the Japanese military
and civilian leadership signed the Instrument of Surrender officially terminating
hostilities. The three and a half years of fighting between the United States and
Japan had been particularly ruthless and bloody, with an estimated 110,000 U.S.
military personnel killed in the Pacific theater. Casualty figures for Japan were
staggering, with over two million military personnel and civilians killed, while
entire sections of major Japanese cities had been reduced to ashes.1
Although the United States remained focused throughout the war on planning
and executing campaigns and operations to defeat both Germany and Japan, it
also spent critical time planning how best to terminate the conflict—on terms
favorable to American interests. Although by August 1945 the United States had
established military ascendancy, casualties had continued to mount with each
successive operation. The unprecedentedly grim numbers of casualties for combatants and civilians combined that were projected for an invasion of Japan easily
would surpass those of previous campaigns, so it was essential to avoid them if at
all possible. Furthermore, Allied statesmen hoped that all the war’s military and
civilian casualties would not have been in vain but would lead to a postwar world
free of German and Japanese militarism, and authoritarianism in general. How
and why this global conflict reached its conclusion in the Pacific as it did, and the
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nature of that conclusion as seen from the perspective of both the United States
and Japan, will be the subject of this article.
This study focuses on the military aspects of conflict termination but does not
ignore the higher-level, political influence on terminating military operations. In
general, a combatant seeks to terminate hostilities so as to make peace on terms
that are aligned with its national interests over the long term. In the Pacific in
1945, the question of the future of the emperor was a key facet of both military
and political aspects of termination; agreeing to a compromise of unconditional
surrender that allowed continuation of a role for the emperor influenced Japan’s
decision to surrender and helped set conditions for the longer-term development
of democracy in Japan, as well as the stability of U.S.-Japanese relations.
Conflict termination is the formal end of major combat operations.2 The process of terminating a conflict can be more difficult than initiating combat actions.
Often civilian and military leaders must address numerous complex challenges
if they are to terminate conflict and create conditions conducive to successful
postconflict operations. In other words, starting a war is much easier than ending one.3 How the critical transition from high-intensity conflict to termination
of hostilities and then to postconflict operations is accomplished has a direct
impact on whether operational victory can be transformed into strategic success.
Consequently, political and military leaders face key planning considerations in
terminating conflict.
The challenge of conflict termination is not simply to accomplish the discontinuation of hostilities at any particular point in time but to transition from
combat to postconflict operations effectively. In essence, successful conflict termination should set the conditions for successful stability operations and lead
directly to the achievement of the strategic objective. Normally, the strategic
leadership of the victorious side in a conflict sets the terms and conditions of
termination, but—as with everything else in war—the enemy certainly has a
role. The cessation of hostilities cannot be a unilateral process, as ultimately the
losing side decides when to terminate conflict. In World War II, both Germany
and Japan continued to fight long after any reasonable expectation of attaining
their objectives had vanished. In short, conflict termination can be a disorderly
process. Setting the stage for a continued military and civilian presence after the
termination of major combat operations is critical to any long-term success in a
region. In other words, theater- and operational-level planning should not focus
on ending hostilities at the expense of what comes next.
Despite the combatants’ strategic and operational focus on achieving military
victory, the process of considering how to terminate the U.S.-Japanese conflict in
the Pacific did not begin in 1945 but as early as mid-1943, after the United States
had assaulted Saipan, Guam, and Tinian in the Mariana Islands. Notwithstanding
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the intense fighting between the combatants up to that point, with even larger and
more-costly operations to follow, the strategic political and military leadership
on both sides began to see the inevitability of a U.S. victory over Japan. Consequently, each combatant began to study how to bring the war to an end on terms
favorable to its own national interests. The United States pushed relentlessly for
unconditional surrender, while Japan sought to force a negotiated settlement.
In planning for the termination of hostilities and the transition to postconflict
operations, U.S. strategic planners feared the worst: revenge, retaliation, and insurgency.4 Fighting in the Pacific was particularly brutal, perhaps matched in its
utter ruthlessness and racial overtones only by the four years of carnage between
Germany and the Soviet Union. Yet the outcome of Japan’s defeat ended up having a much different postscript: a peaceful transition to a new world order and
the development of strong relations between the former enemies.
An examination of conflict termination in the Pacific in 1945 reveals three
major themes: (1) its shaping by America’s relentless offensive operations aimed
at defeating Japanese military power and obtaining political leverage; (2) a
comprehensive U.S. understanding of the operational environment that helped
frame detailed planning and termination criteria; and (3) the Japanese emperor’s
ultimate embrace of the peace faction, upon realizing the futility of continued
fighting. In the end, the victory came about through a conditional surrender that
set the conditions for a smooth transition to postwar stability in Japan.
EFFECTIVE PLANNING AND EXECUTION, 1943–45:
THE RELENTLESS PUSH TO THE END
The essence of conflict termination is “political leverage borne of battlefield success,” and the Pacific theater in World War II provides the perfect illustration of
this truth.5 The United States, after declaring that it sought nothing less than the
unconditional surrender of Japan (and Germany), dedicated its offensive capabilities to destroying the Japanese armed forces to a point at which the United States
could enforce its will over the defeated nation. For its part, Japan aimed to inflict
high casualties on U.S. forces to precipitate a conditional peace. Consequently,
even after the final outcome became obvious to all, Allied offensive operations
and strikes continued—right up until the final seconds of the war. In fact, both
sides’ continued fierce fighting in ongoing operations and their planning of future operations for the remainder of 1945 and beyond were characterized by an
acceptance of the likelihood of staggering casualties, to position themselves better to support their national interests.
Although the United States had stated clearly its strategic priority in the overall
war effort as the defeat of Germany, it never lost sight of the ultimate strategic objective in the Pacific: the defeat of Japan. Only destruction of the Japanese armed
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forces could prevent Japanese aggression in the Pacific and restore U.S. national
interests in the region. From President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s initial December
1941 call for “absolute victory” to the more comprehensive January 1943 declaration of the goal of “unconditional surrender,” the United States transitioned
from an initial strategic defensive into an all-out offensive to destroy Japan’s warmaking capability and enforce its will on a defeated enemy.
At a higher level, America’s desired end state is more difficult to determine
than the concise declaration of “unconditional surrender” communicates. Discernible from the war aims listed in the Cairo Declaration of November 1943
and other strategic-level policy statements, the desired end state of the Allies
amounted to the restoration of Japanese-occupied territories, the creation of
conditions that would prevent Japanese aggression against peace and security,
and the emergence in Japan of a government that respected the international
world order.6
By the start of 1943, the tide of war in the Pacific had turned decidedly in
favor of the United States. American forces had halted Japanese advances in New
Guinea and extended their own lines of operation along its coast, while gaining a
critical base of operations on Guadalcanal. Toward the end of January 1943, at the
Casablanca Conference, President Roosevelt and British prime minister Winston
S. Churchill agreed that the Allies would seek a more definitive strategic objective
in both Europe and the Pacific: the unconditional surrender of both Germany
and Japan. The two leaders were determined to bring peace “to the world only
by a total elimination of German and Japanese war power,” with “the simple formula of placing the objective of this war in terms of an unconditional surrender
by Germany, Italy, and Japan.” Instead of destroying the “populace” of the enemy
nations, they advocated destroying the “philosophy” that was based on “conquest
and subjugation.”7 In other words, the strategic objective had two major elements,
military and political, that amounted to the destruction of enemy armed forces
and the development of democratic governments that aligned with the Allies’
national interests.
Planning at the theater and operational levels of war had a significant impact
on termination of the conflict in the Pacific on terms favorable to U.S. national
interests. In essence, planning is where battlefield success begins. The overall
strategic plan for the defeat of Japan was to advance westward and northwestward, along two main axes of advance from the central and southwest Pacific,
respectively, with the two campaigns conducted at a mutually supportive distance
from each other. Campaign plans developed by the planning staffs of the two
major theater commanders, General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz, employed
U.S. forces in a series of logical steps toward the ultimate objective: the Japanese
mainland. MacArthur’s forces in the Southwest Pacific Area would advance
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northwest from New Guinea to the Philippine Islands, while Nimitz’s forces in the
Pacific Ocean Areas would advance west through the Solomon, Gilbert, Marshall,
and Mariana Islands before supporting MacArthur’s forces in the Philippines in
October 1944. Both MacArthur’s MUSKETEER plans to seize the Philippines and
Nimitz’s Campaign Plan GRANITE, which laid out the sequence of island-hopping
assaults in the Pacific for 1944, illustrate the two theater commanders’ mastery
of the application of operational art to achieve theater strategic objectives. By the
end of 1944, the success of these two prongs would destroy the bulk of Japanese
naval and air power, pushing Japan to the brink of defeat by the spring of 1945.
By mid-1943, when Nimitz’s forces still were fighting for control of the Solomon Islands and MacArthur’s forces were continuing to fight in New Guinea, the
U.S. Joint Staff planners had developed an accurate assessment of Japanese intentions and capabilities that would be instrumental in planning for Japan’s defeat. In
short, the Joint Staff knew that Japan’s ability to “establish undisputed control of
an area in East Asia and the Western Pacific” and to be “self-sufficient economically” even then was slipping away. Japan was now on the strategic defensive,
with any hopes for achieving victory resting on (perceived) Allied war weariness.
American planners understood that Japan’s sea lines of communication (SLOCs)
had become vulnerable to attack, and that “ultimately greatly superior forces can
be directed against her.”8
But even in mid-August 1943 the Combined Chiefs of Staff—the Allies’ strategic planning staff that oversaw all operations in the war—still had some differences of opinion with regard to how to end the conflict with Japan. Together they
were optimistic that termination of the conflict in Europe would allow a “reorientation” of Allied forces to the Pacific.9 While agreeing that the overall strategy
to defeat Japan required retaining China as an ally, destroying Japanese naval
and air power, blockading Japan, and conducting large-scale strategic bombing
of the homeland, American and British planners disagreed on the details. Britain
thought the target date of defeating Japan one year after Germany was too optimistic, and pushed for Nimitz’s central Pacific campaign to be the main effort, as
opposed to the mutually supporting campaigns of Nimitz and MacArthur that
the U.S. Chiefs of Staff advocated.10 But these differences were worked out in
short order—building a consensus in planning for the defeat of Japan that, while
difficult to achieve, was a necessary condition for a lasting victory.
By the end of 1943, the United States and Britain had agreed on how best
to defeat Japan. A Combined Chiefs of Staff report entitled “Overall Plan for
the Defeat of Japan” laid out a clear strategy to achieve victory, and it drove all
subsequent planning at the theater level of war. No longer disagreeing about
whether the campaigns of Nimitz and MacArthur had to be mutually supporting, but instead acknowledging that the central Pacific drive could result in “a
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more rapid advance toward Japan and her vital lines of communication,” the
United States and Britain agreed to conduct intensive bombing and to establish
an air and sea blockade of Japan, thereby setting the conditions for an assault of
the Japanese mainland, if necessary. The result would be the destruction of the
Japanese fleet and air force, the isolation of Japan, and the conduct of carrierbased attacks on the home islands. The two allies also agreed to take advantage
of any Soviet intervention in the Pacific War. The planners still hedged their bets
with regard to plans for future operations, stating that a major assault would take
place in spring 1945 in the Formosa-Luzon-China area.11 Nonetheless, Nimitz’s
Campaign Plan GRANITE was the clear result of the Combined Chiefs guidance,
and the admiral and his staff sequenced all subsequent operations in the central
Pacific (including in the Marshalls, Carolines, and Marianas) “to force the surrender of Japan.”12
As U.S. operations throughout 1944 successfully swept up from the southwest
Pacific and central Pacific, strategic planners wrestled with what should come
next. The critical question was whether to seize Formosa or Luzon on the way to
Japan. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) believed that a key to the defeat of Japan lay
in China; the United States planned to launch an “overwhelming air offensive”
from bases there, and eventually to seize a port in China.13 Therefore, seizing
Formosa was a strategic priority, because doing so would cut the SLOCs between
Japan and its Southern Resource Area, provide a base from which to bomb Japan,
and establish a supply route to China.14
Differences of opinion between Nimitz and MacArthur over what would contribute most to the defeat of Japan led to a meeting with President Roosevelt in
July 1944 to resolve the issue. MacArthur argued decisively that Luzon offered
the greater advantages, both militarily and politically, while Nimitz favored bypassing Luzon for Formosa. Nimitz eventually would change his mind, after the
Japanese seized coastal areas in China in September 1944. By December, the JCS
directed MacArthur to assault Luzon and Nimitz to execute his planned assaults
of Iwo Jima and Okinawa. Interestingly, the JCS never officially terminated planning for Formosa; in the end, events simply would make the point moot.15
Once the decision to strike at Luzon was made, the major question that remained in the Pacific—which drove heated discussions through the spring of
1945—was whether the United States could defeat Japan through blockade and
bombardment or instead would have to conduct an actual massive assault on the
industrial heartland of Japan. The joint planners still hedged their bets at the start
of 1945; they believed an assault on Kyushu would help intensify the blockade
and air bombardment of Japan, as well as set conditions for a follow-on assault
on Honshu.16 The Joint Chiefs knew that difficult fighting remained and warned
that such an invasion might have to wait until 1946. In fact, the British Chiefs of
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Staff now feared that it would take up to two years after the defeat of Germany to
force unconditional surrender on Japan.17
The key to defeating Japan was to destroy Japanese military and economic
power by advancing closer to the home islands incrementally. By the beginning
of 1945, the United States had cut the critical SLOCs between Japan and the
Southern Resource Area, established bases closer to Japan for follow-on operations, and all but destroyed the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) as an effective
fighting force. The series of campaigns and operations that seized decisive points
throughout the southwest and central Pacific, through the Philippines, and toward Japan itself had established the necessary conditions for a final assault on
mainland Japan. The penultimate stage of the war included the seizure of Iwo
Jima and Okinawa, two more decisive points along the main line of operations
toward the ultimate objective. The capture of Iwo Jima gave the United States a
forward air base at which to refuel B-29s from the Marianas and from which to
provide fighter cover for the attacks on the main islands, as well as to act as a
sanctuary at which damaged aircraft could make emergency landings.18
Despite the plethora of military successes at the operational and theater levels
in the Pacific, the United States still expected prolongation of the conflict. In
May 1945, as Germany surrendered to the Allies only after a titanic battle in the
streets of Berlin, the Joint Chiefs feared that Japan too would fight on at any cost
to prevent the invasion of the home islands. They understood that “the prospect
of the Emperor and the Imperial Family being in the hands of a foreign invader
is repulsive and unthinkable to the Japanese.”19 Wary that the Japanese might sue
for peace to prevent an actual occupation of Japan and fearful that the American
public’s war weariness would lead to acceptance of such a conditional surrender
in the Pacific, the Joint Chiefs reemphasized that their objective was unconditional surrender.20
To compel Japan to surrender, the United States continued to conduct strikes
and attacks throughout the summer of 1945, right up to the final moments of
the war. Once Okinawa fell to U.S. forces in June 1945, continued bombing by
the Strategic Air Force in the Marianas, the Tactical Air Force on Okinawa, and
the Third Fleet intensified pressure on Japan. Strategic bombing, especially by B29s conducting incendiary and low-level attacks, devastated Japanese cities and
industrial areas, killing thousands of civilians in the process. Offensive mining,
conducted under the aptly named Operation STARVATION, continued to isolate
Japan from its critical SLOCs.21 In addition, the blockade of Japan through the
destruction of its merchant shipping and naval fleet by air attacks and submarines
cut off Japan from essential imports such as oil, coal, and iron ore.22
As the Japanese political and military leadership debated whether to terminate
the country’s military operations, U.S. strategic air, carrier-based air, and surface
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forces continued to pound targets on the main islands of Japan. On 10 August,
Nimitz warned that “the public announcement by the Japanese of counter proposals for the termination of the war must not be permitted to affect vigilance
against Japanese attacks” and that “offensive action shall be continued unless
otherwise specifically directed.”23 In addition, on 14 August, General Carl A.
Spaatz’s Twentieth Air Force bombed northern Honshu with over eight hundred
B-29s, from the Marianas. Even on 15 August, the day on which Japan formally
announced its surrender, over a hundred aircraft from Admiral William F. Halsey
Jr.’s Third Fleet carriers struck Japanese airfields on Honshu—minutes before
Nimitz’s order to “suspend attack air operations” was received.24
The United States also leveraged its “information instrument of power” to
compel Japan to surrender. Information operations aimed to convince Japanese
decision makers and the Japanese people that continued resistance was hopeless.
From February 1945 through the end of the war, U.S. naval aircraft and B-29s
dropped millions of leaflets on the home islands. With the objective of cracking
Japanese morale and pressuring the people to petition the emperor, the leaflets
eventually warned civilians that their cities would be destroyed by B-29 raids and
informed them of the text of the Potsdam Declaration, the atomic bomb attacks,
and Soviet entry into the war.25
With U.S. forces occupying Okinawa and preparing for the final assault, Hiroshima and Nagasaki in ruins, and Soviet forces driving deep into Manchuria,
Japan’s strategic leadership eventually decided that it could resist no longer. In the
end Japan surrendered, even as 2.5 million combat-equipped troops prepared to
defend against the American assault forces poised to seize Kyushu and Honshu.
Thus, by August 1945 successful U.S. military operations finally had created
sufficient political leverage to force Japanese decision makers (both civilian and
military) to cease hostilities.
PLANNING FOR CONFLICT TERMINATION AND BEYOND:
UNDERSTANDING THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
Thorough understanding of the operational environment played a key role in
winning the war in the Pacific and would play a crucial role in winning the peace.
Allied intelligence estimates, based on intercepts and decryption of Japanese
diplomatic and military communications, allowed the United States to offset
Japan’s advantages and exploit its weaknesses. In the final phase of the conflict
in the Pacific, the United States developed a comprehensive picture of Japanese
capabilities and intentions, which supported Allied plans for the final campaign
against Kyushu and Honshu while simultaneously enlightening planners and
decision makers regarding the primacy of the emperor to the nation of Japan.
With this combination of a clear idea of how the Japanese military was preparing
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to defend the mainland and the thinking of Japan’s national strategic leadership,
the United States was able to conduct thorough planning for the final assault of
Japan while concurrently developing termination criteria that not only suited its
own national interests but also, eventually, appealed to the emperor and members
of his inner circle.
In planning for conflict termination, the United States (and Britain) had developed a comprehensive assessment of the state of Japan’s military and political
strengths and weaknesses. The Combined Chiefs of Staff had an accurate picture
of Japan’s intent and capabilities that helped shape planning for the final campaign of the war, as well as termination criteria that fell short of unconditional
surrender. They correctly surmised that the Japanese equated unconditional surrender with “national extinction” and understood that the Japanese government
in July 1945 wanted to “fight as long and as desperately as possible in the hope
of avoiding complete defeat and of acquiring a better bargaining position in a
negotiated peace.”26
In addition, the U.S. State Department had formulated a plan to shape the
termination debate and to establish a postwar occupation policy. Acting Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew understood that preserving the institution of the
emperor was an “irreducible” Japanese condition for surrender and that trying
the emperor as a war criminal or abolishing the throne would lead to “prolonged
resistance.”27 His counterpart in the War Department, Secretary of War Henry L.
Stimson, agreed that if the United States acceded to maintaining a constitutional
monarchy under the present emperor, then Japan would be much more likely to
surrender.28 These powerful voices would help influence President Harry S. Truman to accept conflict termination on terms short of unconditional surrender.
Planning the Final Assaults: OLYMPIC and CORONET
The campaigns of Nimitz and MacArthur had set the conditions for the final
assault on the main islands of Japan itself. The critical question that remained,
however, was whether such an assault was necessary to compel Japan to surrender or the same objective could be achieved with fewer American casualties via
blockade and continued bombing.
By April 1945, the Joint Chiefs had come to the conclusion that the invasion
of Japan was a prerequisite to forcing unconditional surrender. They feared that
bombardment and blockade could lead to a negotiated peace, and that only an
assault on the Japanese home islands would force absolute surrender. They also
questioned whether Japan ever actually would surrender and argued that the
United States was compelled to bring about a “decisive military defeat.” The
Joint Chiefs believed that only the military instrument of national power would
achieve the ultimate objective of defeating Japan: “Unless a definition of unconditional surrender can be given which is acceptable to the Japanese, there is no
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alternative to annihilation and no prospect that the threat of absolute defeat will
bring about capitulation.”29
Additional fighting would not be easy. The planned operations—OLYMPIC
and CORONET—were given an end date of June 1946, under the overall cover
name DOWNFALL.30 Casualty estimates were high for both sides; for Operation
OLYMPIC alone, casualties for U.S. forces were projected to be 150,000–160,000,
including upward of 38,000 killed in action, while Japan was expected to suffer
upward of 250,000 combatants and 380,000 civilians killed.31
Yet clearly the Joint Chiefs had listened to General MacArthur, who believed
firmly that invading Kyushu and Honshu would be necessary. In a communication to General George C. Marshall, the Army chief of staff, MacArthur recommended an attack on Kyushu, to provide land-based air cover for the ultimate
objective, “a decisive assault on Honshu.” Dismissing two other courses of action
to force Japan’s surrender—continued bombardment and blockade—as being too
time-consuming, MacArthur argued that the assaults on Kyushu and Honshu
“would permit application of full power of our combined resources, ground,
naval, and air, on the decisive objective.” In his estimation, the approach could
force Japan to surrender earlier than anticipated. Amphibious assaults had been
a staple of successful maritime warfare in MacArthur’s island-hopping campaigns
in the Pacific throughout the war, and the general had no intention of dismissing
the method that had been perfected over the preceding three years.32
While MacArthur wholeheartedly supported an invasion of Japan, Nimitz
advocated an alternate course of action. He saw great risk in a major assault on
Kyushu and Honshu, for three reasons: Japan’s fighting capability in defensive
warfare, the traditional Japanese refusal to surrender, and the use of suicide attacks. Nimitz firmly believed that the defeat of Japan was inevitable and a direct
assault rash. In a communication to Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander in
Chief, U.S. Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations, Nimitz argued in April 1945
that “unless speed is considered so important that we are willing to accept less
than the best preparation and more than minimum casualties, I believe that the
long range interests of the U.S. will be better served if we continue during 1945
to isolate Japan and to destroy Jap[anese] forces and resources by naval and air
attack.”33 Thus, the two U.S. theater commanders in the Pacific initially were at
odds over how best to defeat Japan and bring the war to an end.
Soon, however, they would be coordinating their efforts in planning for the
final assaults on Japan, because on 25 May the Joint Chiefs put an end to any remaining relevant discussion over the invasion of the Japanese home islands. They
issued a planning directive to the theater commanders for the assault of Kyushu,
Operation OLYMPIC, with a target date of 1 November 1945.34 The amphibious assault would be the largest in history and would be the first of two major

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020

11

Naval War College Review, Vol. 73 [2020], No. 3, Art. 9

S H U S T E R & S H I M O DA I R A

123

operations planned to seize Japan and force the enemy to surrender. American
strategic leadership believed that success in these final operations would compel
the Japanese to terminate the conflict and provide the United States with the
utmost leverage to set conditions for long-term stability within the context of
U.S. national interests. In a meeting with President Truman on 18 June, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, along with Stimson and Navy Secretary James V. Forrestal, were
unanimous in their agreement that Operation OLYMPIC offered the best chance
to defeat Japan once and for all.35
Planning the Peace: BLACKLIST and CAMPUS
Although the Joint Chiefs had come to the conclusion that capturing the home
islands likely was the only way to compel the Japanese to surrender, they also
ensured that contingency plans were drawn up so they could be executed if the
Japanese surrendered at any time. On 14 June 1945, the chiefs directed both
Nimitz and MacArthur to plan for the “sudden collapse or surrender of Japan” to
ensure that the United States could take advantage of such a situation with regard
to the subsequent occupation.36 As a result, both theater commanders drafted
contingency plans—CAMPUS and BLACKLIST—that could be executed on Japan’s
surrender. Thus, while winning the war was difficult enough, now the United
States also would plan to win the peace. Once again, employing the right force
at the right time and place would be paramount in translating a military victory
into long-term strategic success.
Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur synchronized their efforts in planning for the sudden surrender of Japan. By 3 August, just days before the surrender occurred, the two theater commanders had worked out all major issues.37
Nimitz developed Operation CAMPUS to have three distinct phases: (1) the
“emergency naval occupation of Tokyo Bay”; (2) the “complete deployment of
naval occupation forces”; and (3) “amphibious operations connected with the
occupation of Japan by U.S. Army forces.”38 CAMPUS became the naval component of Operation BLACKLIST, detailing the naval and amphibious phases of the
overall operation, focused on the rapid occupation of Tokyo Bay and other strategic areas as a prelude to the entry of U.S. Army forces. Its major tasks included
conducting the amphibious phases of BLACKLIST and supporting the land phases
of the occupation, maintaining the lines of communication to Japan, clearing
minefields, ensuring the destruction or seizure of the remaining IJN fleet, and
establishing naval and naval air facilities for follow-on operations.39 The plan also
gave American occupation forces the authority to impose “drastic penalties” if
they encountered Japanese noncompliance with U.S. postconflict directives. Possible sanctions and reprisals included the forced evacuation and destruction of
communities, bombing, the destruction of property, and the taking of hostages.40
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MacArthur distributed the plan for Operation BLACKLIST on 8 August, one
week before the Japanese surrender. The plan acted as a guide for “prompt action
upon termination of organized resistance in the areas to be occupied,” including
the control of Japanese military forces and civilians and the enforcement of the
final terms of surrender.41 Overall, the plan consisted of a progressive occupation
of fourteen areas in Japan (and some areas in Korea) that ensured American control of Japan’s instruments of national power. A key component of the plan was
to use existing Japanese military and political organizations. This would reduce
the number of U.S. forces required for occupation duty and allow for a degree of
stability in the rebuilding process of Japan. Still, the plan called for the occupation
of Japan with a total force of over seven hundred thousand U.S. forces. The initial
focus of BLACKLIST would be to prevent the resumption of hostilities, including
disarming Japanese forces immediately and establishing control over communications.42 BLACKLIST would go into effect immediately on Japan’s surrender.
The Atomic Bomb and Entry of the Soviet Union into the Pacific War
Two final factors—the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki
and the Soviet Union’s entry into the Pacific War—exerted additional pressure on
the Japanese government to surrender and emphasized the point that the United
States was still seeking unlimited means to destroy Japan. There were, and would
be, few, if any, restrictions on the means pursued and efforts wielded to achieve
battlefield success in pursuit of political leverage to affect a postwar settlement.
Historians have written much about the atomic bomb being the decisive factor in forcing surrender, somewhat less assessing the overall impact of the Soviet
intervention.43 However, the use of atomic bombs against Japanese cities and
the Soviet invasion of Japanese-occupied territory were merely additional, and
certainly not the only, factors in forcing the Japanese government to surrender.
Asserting any such single or narrow explanation for Japan’s surrender ignores two
critical contributions up to that point: the relentless push of offensive operations
that already had driven Japan to the brink of military defeat, and a comprehensive
understanding of the strategic and operational environments that had allowed
the Allies to plan for war termination and to develop effective termination criteria that would lead the Japanese to accede to surrendering. Although these issues
still are debated hotly today, the fact that by 1945 the United States had reduced
Japanese military strength significantly and had captured key island chains already had established the conditions in which these final two events took place.44
The use of the bombs certainly stunned Japan’s strategic leadership, but mostly
it reinforced the existing intentions of both the war and peace factions, respectively to continue or terminate operations.45 The Soviet invasion of Manchuria
on 9 August added to Japan’s desperate situation. Earlier in the war, the U.S. Joint
Chiefs of Staff had supported Soviet armed intervention against Japan, arguing
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that “every effort should be made to bring the U.S.S.R. into the war against Japan
at the earliest practicable date.”46 After Germany surrendered, the Soviets had
agreed at the Potsdam Conference in July 1945 to launch an invasion of Japaneseheld territory. News of the Soviet invasion of Manchuria stunned Japan’s strategic
leadership, but it too essentially reinforced the existing beliefs of both the war and
peace factions that surrounded the emperor.47
The confluence of ongoing U.S. operations, the use of the atomic bombs, and
the Soviet invasion of Japanese territory emphasize the nearly unlimited nature
of the war the Allies waged to gain political leverage. One final piece—American
willingness to compromise on unconditional surrender—would give Japan’s strategic leadership an olive branch to grasp.
Potsdam and Conditional Surrender
One of the greatest challenges for American strategic leadership in the Pacific
War was the transition from war to peace. At the end of a conflict characterized
by its brutality, enormous cost in military and civilian lives, and racial overtones,
how could the United States establish long-term stability in the region, to ensure
that the achievement of the strategic objective of (almost) unconditional surrender would not be ephemeral? By developing and acting on a holistic understanding of the operational environment—particularly the primacy to the Japanese
people and leadership of the imperial family—the United States was able to appeal to the peace faction and make inroads into the war faction, enabling it to end
the conflict without conducting a bloody assault on the main islands.
The Potsdam Declaration, signed by the United States, Britain, and China on
26 July 1945, made it clear to Japan that continued resistance would be met with
a united military response. The Allies offered a simple but blunt choice: unconditional surrender or “prompt and utter destruction.” Continuation of the war
therefore promised Japan a grim future. Unconditional surrender amounted to
acceptance of the occupation of Japanese territory until Japan eliminated militarism, disarmed its armed forces and industry, and accepted war crimes trials.48
At this point, there was no specific mention of the fate of the emperor and the
imperial system, but it soon became a key sticking point affecting the decision
whether to terminate hostilities.
Although unconditional surrender had been the clear American objective for
over two years, cracks in its foundation began to appear in 1945. The critical issue that emerged within U.S. (as well as Japanese) strategic leadership circles in
the waning days of the war was the role of the emperor in postwar Japan. In fact,
short of conducting an all-out assault on the Japanese home islands, achieving a
cessation of hostilities in the Pacific depended on it. There were two schools of
thought in the United States; those who favored keeping the emperor included
Secretary of War Stimson, Under Secretary of State Grew, and Chief of Staff to the
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Commander in Chief Admiral William D. Leahy, while those who advocated his
removal included Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, Assistant Secretary of State
Dean G. Acheson, and former Secretary of State Cordell Hull.
The first group argued that failure to preserve the emperor would prolong
the war—in particular, that Japanese forces would recognize only the authority of the emperor with regard to surrender. As early as 1943 Grew had argued
that after the war the Japanese throne could “serve as a cornerstone for healthy
and peaceful internal growth.” 49 He believed that maintaining the emperor
could hasten Japan’s surrender without the need for a bloody assault on the
home islands.50 Stimson agreed that if the United States proposed maintaining
“a constitutional monarchy” under the present emperor, then Japan would be
much more likely to surrender.51 Leahy, who as military adviser to the president
had considerable influence on this question, warned President Truman that
insistence on unconditional surrender would lead to Japanese desperation and
increased U.S. casualties.52
The second school of thought believed that keeping the emperor—the symbol
of Japanese militarism—would encourage the militarists and thereby prolong the
war, as well as create political problems back in America. Hull considered that
anything short of unconditional surrender was “appeasement,” while Byrnes argued that the United States must set the terms of surrender.53 In addition, “unconditional surrender” was a powerful motto back home; the majority of Americans
supported it and saw the emperor as a war criminal.54
In the end, conditional surrender won the day. Sizable Japanese forces still
waited in the home islands and others were scattered across China, Southeast
Asia, and the Netherlands East Indies. Allied civilian and military leaders understood the critical importance of the emperor as the figure who could order the
surrender of fighters who otherwise would be willing to carry on to the death.
Navy Secretary Forrestal’s proposal to keep the emperor in place but follow
the intents and purposes of the Potsdam Declaration provided a way out for
both combatants. On 10 August, Japan finally agreed to accept the Potsdam
Declaration, with the added condition of preserving the emperor. The following
day, Secretary of State Byrnes sent a reply through official channels in which the
Allies insisted that the authority of the emperor be subject to the authority of the
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (General MacArthur).55 In this way
an uneasy, and rather vague, compromise to unconditional surrender was worked
out. President Truman feared domestic political backlash but agreed to the compromise, stating simply: “They wanted to keep the Emperor. We told ’em we’d tell
’em how to keep him, but we’d make the terms.”56 Despite contentious debates
within American and Japanese strategic leadership circles, the former combatants
had found an acceptable solution to end the war in the Pacific.
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THE EMPEROR AND THE INFLUENCE OF THE PEACE FACTION
History is rife with instances in which a combatant facing certain defeat continued to fight on long after there was any chance of achieving his or its objectives.
This is particularly true when a nation is confronted with an existential threat to
its way of life.
Yet political leverage still can exert a significant influence on conflict termination—even when wielded by the vanquished. The acquisition and retention of
political leverage was a primary factor that drove Japanese planning for the final
defense of the mainland. The concept was no different from plans Japan had
made and executed the previous year, when Japanese forces fought to the death
on the battlefield in pursuit of a negotiated settlement to the conflict. By forcing
an unprecedented bloodletting on American forces, and at the cost of the lives
of hundreds of thousands of its own citizens, Japan sought to exact concessions
from the United States to achieve a postwar settlement that fell short of unconditional surrender. The importance of maintaining the emperor became the primary factor that brought the Japanese to a willingness to terminate the conflict.
Faction versus Faction
Once the tide of war turned against the Japanese, political factions emerged in
Japan that would help shape its surrender. Throughout the war the Imperial
Japanese Army (IJA) and the IJN held divergent views on the direction of the
war, and achieving any reconciliation between them or any compromise on how
to terminate the conflict proved as challenging as ever. Hostility between the two
services was nothing new in Japan, as it had existed in the years leading up to
outbreak of the war. Now, with the military situation leaving Japan in dire straits,
the split between the views of the two political factions, including between the
services, created difficulties for the emperor. The ministry of the IJN’s Security
Research Division averred that “the present state is confrontation. The country
must become one.”57
As early as September 1943, former premiers (known as jushin [principal subjects]) advocated seeking a peace settlement on favorable terms. They wanted to
replace Premier Hideki Tōjō, an IJA hawk, with a more moderate premier. When
Tōjō resigned in July 1944 after the devastating loss of Saipan, the jushin selected
retired general Kuniaki Koiso and retired admiral Mitsumasa Yonai to lead the
government (Koiso became premier). However, the Koiso cabinet’s stance remained one of “all-out prosecution of the war” because Koiso believed that only
a military success could improve Japan’s power to negotiate an end to the war on
more-favorable terms.58 Thus, Japan too believed that achieving battlefield success was a prerequisite for exerting political leverage.
By January 1945, with the United States in control of Saipan and the Philippines, the emperor had expressed concern that Japan’s hopes for victory were
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fading fast. At that point, however, the emperor was in favor of continuing the war,
and he approved a directive to defend the homeland against invasion in “the final
decisive battle of the war.”59 But when he met in February with members of the
jushin to hear their views on Japan’s situation at the time, the emperor discovered
that some favored peace, with former prime minister Fumimaro Konoe going
so far as to advise the emperor to “end the war as soon as possible.”60 Continued
defeat on the battlefield combined with diplomatic setbacks (e.g., the breakdown
of the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact) forced the resignation of Koiso in spring
1945. Members of the peace faction, however, faced a conundrum. They had to select as a replacement someone who advocated peace yet also would be acceptable
to the hawks. Admiral Kantarō Suzuki became the clear choice, and his cabinet,
consisting of General Korechika Anami as war minister, Admiral Yonai as navy
minister, and Mr. Shigenori Tōgō as foreign minister, would govern from 7 April
1945 through the final surrender.61
Upon taking over, Suzuki believed that the emperor wished to reach a settlement of the war, but the new premier advocated continued hostilities until the
moment was right for a negotiated settlement. This decision also would help keep
his cabinet intact.62 So even as U.S. forces assaulted Okinawa and B-29s continued
to pound Japan’s cities, Japan’s strategic leadership had split into two diametrically
opposed factions, and the factors that prevented conflict termination in Japan—
insistence on preserving the emperor, the desire to save face, and fear of a coup—
remained dominant.63
Even as U.S. forces captured Luzon, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa, Japan’s strategic
leadership sought to protect its diminished gains by continuing to fight so as to
reach a negotiated settlement to the conflict. In June 1945, despite overwhelmingly negative reports from the battlefield, a deteriorating diplomatic effort
regarding the possibility of Soviet mediation, and indications of Soviet troop
movements toward Japanese-occupied Manchuria, the official policy of the
Supreme Council for the Direction of the War on 8 June was “to prosecute the
war to the end in order to preserve the national polity and protect the Imperial
Homeland.”64 The military was in the midst of planning the KETSU-GO operation—the final decisive battle to annihilate any Americans who attempted to invade mainland Japan—so as to obtain political leverage for a negotiated settlement.65 Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal of Japan Kōichi Kido, a key advocate of the
peace faction, now conducted a last-ditch effort to appeal directly to the emperor.
He aimed to achieve “an honorable peace” with his “Draft Plan of Countermeasures to Meet the Situation,” which warned of the inevitability of mass civilian
casualties from Allied bombing and worsening starvation with the coming of
winter. At this point, the emperor was moved by Kido’s plan, favoring diplomatic
efforts over a decisive battle.66 However, the opposition faction, composed of
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War Minister Anami and the chiefs of the army and navy, believed Japan could
secure more-favorable conditions if their services defended the mainland against
invasion and inflicted heavy casualties on U.S. forces.67 In short, political leverage
could be bought at the cost of thousands of American and hundreds of thousands
of Japanese lives.
The release of the Potsdam Declaration on 26 July had a polarizing effect on
the two major political factions. The doves feared that rejecting the terms would
lead to serious consequences, while the hawks considered acceptance tantamount
to unconditional surrender. This divided stance led to maintaining the status
quo in terms of continuing hostilities while clinging to the false hope of either
a breakthrough in the pursuit of Soviet mediation or a military success that
forced the United States to negotiate. So at this point Japan rejected the Potsdam
Declaration. Prime Minister Suzuki claimed that Japan simply would ignore it.68
However, after reports of the devastation of Hiroshima reached Tokyo on the
afternoon of 6 August, Foreign Affairs Minister Tōgō again urged acceptance of
the declaration. The emperor finally agreed that Japan no longer could delay the
decision to terminate the conflict.69
The dropping of the second bomb, on Nagasaki, and the Soviet invasion of
Manchuria and northern Japan exposed once again the deep divisions within
Japan’s strategic leadership. Even as the doves argued that continuing the conflict
would lead to the ultimate extinction of the nation itself, the hawks continued
to counter that once severe casualties had been inflicted on the expected invasion force favorable terms still would be possible. Eventually the combined effect
of recent events proved to be too much for the emperor, however, and he met
with the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War on 10 August—a day of
reckoning. Tōgō pushed for acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration, with one
condition: “the defense of the Constitution.” Yonai, the minister of the navy, and
Kiichirō Hiranuma, lord president of the council, supported him. On the other
hand, Anami, the minister of the army, demanded a number of conditions: (1)
the Japanese, and not the Allies, would disarm all overseas Japanese forces; (2)
only the Japanese government itself could prosecute war criminals; and (3) the
Allies would not occupy Japan. Despite the fact that insisting on these conditions
would mean continuation of the war, General Yoshijirō Umezu, the chief of the
army general staff, and Admiral Soemu Toyoda, the chief of the naval general
staff, supported the position.70
The one issue on which both factions unanimously agreed was the necessity
to maintain the emperor, in victory or defeat. The emperor was a sacred figure
in Japan, and his wishes were a decisive influence over policy. Finally, at this desperate hour, the emperor forced an uneasy reconciliation of the factions, stating
as follows: “I have given serious thought to the situation prevailing at home and
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abroad and have concluded that continuing the war can only mean destruction
for the nation.”71 Consequently, at 0400 on 10 August, the Supreme Council for
the Direction of the War agreed to accept the Potsdam Declaration—with the
caveat that the emperor remain as sovereign ruler. Although the political factions
continued to argue over interpretations of Byrnes’s note, which left the emperor
on the throne but under the authority of the Supreme Commander for the Allied
Powers, they sensed a coup d’état looming, so they resorted to a final conference
with the emperor on 14 August. An emotional emperor reiterated his stance
that “it is pointless to continue the war any longer.”72 He finally had broken the
deadlock. The ultimate decision to surrender was sent through official channels
to the Allies, who accepted promptly, and an imperial rescript was broadcast to
the people the next day.73 U.S. strategic leadership thereby had compromised on
unconditional surrender, accepting the continuation of the emperor but under
the authority of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.
The decisions of the emperor to intervene to break the deadlock in the council
over the direction of the war and to broadcast his resultant surrender decision to
the people of Japan were key components of the successful conflict termination.
Those actions, combined with an additional imperial rescript on 2 September
that directed the people to comply with the surrender demands, showed that
the emperor had embraced peace, belatedly but assuredly.74 Given the emperor’s
sacred position and authority in Japan, the imperial rescripts exerted a tremendous influence, leading to a successful transition to peace throughout Japaneseoccupied territories and in the home islands.
A Key Advocate for Conflict Termination: Rear Admiral Sōkichi Takagi
To understand the emperor’s final decision to capitulate, it is necessary to examine the role of Rear Admiral Sōkichi Takagi, IJN. This respected naval officer
wielded a decisive influence within the peace faction.
Takagi’s relationship with the Kyoto school was the source of a critical portion
of that influence. The Kyoto school was a philosophical and interdisciplinary
movement centered at Kyoto University that assimilated Western philosophy and
religious beliefs with Japanese philosophy and religious beliefs; in particular, it
embraced a synthesis of the Eastern philosophy of religion with Western scientific culture. From early on the Kyoto school had criticized the entire idea of the
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere as constituting an empty motto, believing
it was impossible to establish cooperation in the occupied areas.75
Takagi’s role in ending the war began in earnest in 1943. Shortly after his promotion to rear admiral, Takagi received a secret order from Shigeyoshi Inoue,
undersecretary of the IJN, tasking him with assessing the true situation in the
Pacific War. By 1944, Takagi was engaged actively in determining how best to terminate the war, by providing key influence and support to IJN minister Yonai.76
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At the end of August 1944, Takagi resigned his post as Bureau Chief of Military
Education at the Navy Ministry, having been ordered secretly by Minister Yonai
and Vice-Minister Inoue to inquire into possible ways to terminate the war. To
that end, he frequently moved among senior statesmen, IJA and IJN officers, and
imperial family members to collect information and coordinate actions. After
months of research, in May 1945 Takagi developed a proposal based on the rapidly deteriorating military situation. The report included the idea of conducting
peace negotiations via Soviet mediation, with the intent of terminating the conflict prior to any possibility of a decisive battle on the Japanese mainland. Takagi
then worked to influence the positions of the emperor and additional IJN officers.77 However, when the Suzuki cabinet held its first imperial conference on 8
June, it decided once again in favor of a decisive battle on the mainland, intended
to exact concessions from the United States.78
With the IJA intent on continuing the conflict to the bitter end, regardless of
military and civilian losses, Takagi emerged as an influential moderate. Holding
frequent discussions with adherents of the Kyoto school, Takagi helped provide
the IJN with a voice of reason. The relationship between the IJN and the Kyoto
school produced a combination that emerged as “the only power [that could]
control the reckless war expansion of the IJA.”79 Discussions among members
of the Kyoto school and Takagi focused on analysis of the historical background
of the war, the current domestic and foreign situations, possible modifications
to the national war strategy and policy, and the prospects for ceasing hostilities.
With Takagi reaching out to the Kyoto school to produce a body of ideas that
could help terminate the conflict in the Pacific, the IJN eventually was able to
help modify the war policy of the emperor and the imperial faction that up to that
point had advocated the extreme-right nationalism tied to the IJA.
As the Japanese political and military leadership debated how the war in the
Pacific should end, Takagi worked hard to influence key decision makers to terminate the conflict and prevent additional devastation and bloodshed. He was
not afraid to speak his mind and assess Japan’s situation in objective terms. To
counter the IJA’s desire to carry on the fight, Takagi continued to urge the emperor to terminate the war.80 He criticized the IJA for “madly proclaiming that the
time had come to stage a great decisive battle on the homeland that would defeat
the enemy.”81 Takagi continued this work to enlighten other members of the Japanese military and political leadership right up to the end of the war, contributing
his objective assessments to the emperor’s cabinet when Japan was in the throes
of uncertainty and desperation about what lay ahead. He fully understood the
difficulty of terminating a conflict that many in Japan had believed was certain
to end in victory. Takagi commented that “there were few people who knew the
hardship of the front that was near to the IJA and the IJN, the internal conditions
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and destruction; the government and supreme command were desperate, although we hid the truth.”82
Takagi, however, was a realist, and he emerged as a critical influence over the
emperor in the final phase of the war in the Pacific. By August 1945, Takagi had
become an instrumental figure as the “master of war termination,” advocating
behind the scenes for an unpopular position: convincing the emperor and key
cabinet members to seek an end to the war.83 Eventually his efforts helped sway
the emperor to make a decision amid a factious cabinet. In the end the emperor
took the position that Takagi and the peace faction supported.
Takagi, along with the intellectuals of the Kyoto school, was able to influence
the IJN in the final phase of the Pacific War, giving the peace faction within the
emperor’s cabinet an accurate assessment of Japan’s true situation. Together they
provided Japan’s strategic leadership with sound military advice that took into
consideration the impact that continued military operations would have on the
civilian population. More importantly, they helped shape the emperor’s evolution
from war to peace.
The surrender ceremony, held on the deck of the Third Fleet flagship USS Missouri, was a solemn affair—punctuated by a clear message to the political leadership, armed forces, and people of Japan. During the signing of the Instrument
of Surrender, the United States and its allies demonstrated, in the air and on the
sea, their enormous military power. Hundreds of U.S. Army and Navy planes
flew overhead, while over 250 ships from the United States, Britain, Australia,
and New Zealand filled the expanse of Tokyo Bay.84 There would be no way for a
“stab in the back” myth to arise in Japan; a massive armada had come to the very
doorstep of the Japanese mainland to emphasize the vast military power that had
defeated Japan and that could be called on again if Japan did not comply with the
Instrument of Surrender. Five days later, General MacArthur arrived in Tokyo
and raised above the U.S. embassy the American flag—in fact, the very same flag
that had flown over Washington, DC, on 7 December 1941 and on the battleship
Missouri during the surrender.85
The American victory over Japan was complete. Not only did Japan agree
to terminate its military operations and disarm, but it also pledged to work in
good faith with U.S. forces in the occupation and rebuilding of Japan. In signing the Instrument of Surrender, Japan agreed to the unconditional surrender
of all military forces and to the terms of the Potsdam Declaration. The emperor
would remain in power—under the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. In essence, the arrangements constituted an unconditional surrender for the
military but a conditional surrender for the nation. Setting the conditions for a
peaceful occupation, Japan also agreed “to obey and enforce all proclamations”
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of the supreme commander (MacArthur) and “to carry out the provisions of the
Potsdam Declaration in good faith.”86
The transition to a peacetime occupation proceeded remarkably free of conflict. Although U.S. occupation forces were given the authority to impose severe
penalties in cases of Japanese noncompliance with occupation directives, the
words of the emperor had allowed the Japanese to absorb their shocking defeat
and begin to work with their former enemy to rebuild their nation. The United
States, however, took no chances. Third Fleet forces, anchored in Tokyo Bay and
the Sagami Sea, trained their big guns on targets ashore, while the initial airborne
and amphibious landing forces on 30 August were equipped with full combat
equipment.87 Despite a last-ditch coup d’état attempt by a few hard-line IJA officers who refused to accept the emperor’s surrender proclamation, Japanese army
commanders took steps to surrender their sizable forces in Japan and throughout
its overseas empire. General MacArthur was impressed with the level of compliance, reporting that the Japanese in general were “acting in complete good
faith.”88 This level of compliance would last throughout the seven-year period of
occupation. Leaving the emperor on the throne, despite an outcry in the United
States demanding his removal and punishment, was a critical decision that led to
the relatively smooth transition to peace.
Conflict termination in the Pacific in World War II occurred despite the fact
that each of the combatants was willing and able to carry on the fight into 1946.
Driven by their different strategic objectives—unconditional surrender and a
negotiated settlement—each side sought to translate military action into political success, trading lives for political leverage in the postwar period. The United
States was ready to conduct a final campaign to seize and occupy the home islands, while the Japanese planned to incur (and suffer) unprecedented casualties
to force the United States to negotiate a peace short of unconditional surrender.
Fortunately, the strategic leadership on each side was open to compromise. Comprehensive understanding of the operational environment allowed the United
States to set the conditions for termination and to understand and appreciate the
importance of the emperor’s continued authority, while the emperor himself understood Japan’s desperate situation and ultimately embraced the peace faction’s
willingness to end the fighting.
Compelling Japan to surrender without an Allied invasion of the mainland
prevented tremendous destruction and the unnecessary loss of countless lives.
This represented the epitome of political leverage borne by success on the
battlefield. Postwar analysis by the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey concluded the
following: “Japan’s acceptance of defeat without invasion while still possessed of
2.5 million combat-equipped troops and 9,000 Kamikaze airplanes in the home
islands, reveals how persuasively the consequences of [U.S.] operations were
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translated into political results.”89 With clear strategic and operational objectives,
U.S. planners had devised and conducted a series of campaigns and operations in
a logical sequence that brought U.S. military forces closer and closer to Japan. By
1945, with U.S. forces poised at the doorstep of the Japanese mainland, the United
States had set the conditions for terminating the conflict, while the dropping of
the atomic bombs and the Soviet invasion of Manchuria provided the final push
to capitulation.
Throughout much of the war, the United States had a clear picture of Japanese
capabilities and intentions, and this thorough understanding of the operational
environment helped shape detailed planning and the development of termination
criteria. With U.S. forces preparing for the final assault on the home islands that
would compel the Japanese to surrender at great cost, key strategic leaders, such
as Stimson and Grew, understood that unconditional surrender, especially the
elimination of the emperor, confronted Japan with an existential threat to its way
of life that would prolong the conflict. This understanding of the primacy of the
emperor to the nation of Japan allowed President Truman ultimately to embrace
the idea of a conditional surrender, at least to the extent of maintaining the emperor under the authority of MacArthur. This compromise appealed sufficiently
to the emperor and his inner circle for them to accept it.
The ultimate factor leading to the termination of hostilities in August 1945
was the emperor and his decision to embrace the peace faction in Japan. Under
the keen influence of Rear Admiral Takagi, a key segment of Japan’s political and
naval leadership pushed for termination to avoid additional bloodshed and save
the mainland from certain destruction. Despite the splitting of his inner circle
into two camps, the emperor finally made the decision to terminate Japanese
military operations when it became clear that continued resistance offered far
more risk to the nation than the possible reaction from hard-liners in the IJA. In
doing so, he accepted the weakening of his authority in postwar Japan under U.S.
leadership, but set the conditions for a successful transition to a peaceful occupation and the rebuilding of his nation.
The thousands of U.S. soldiers, sailors, Marines, and airmen who died thousands of miles from home, as well as the hundreds of thousands of Japanese
soldiers, sailors, and civilians who perished right through the waning minutes of
the war, are testament to the unprecedented destruction resulting from a global
conflict that often did not distinguish between combatants and noncombatants.
Only relentless operations and careful U.S. planning that resulted from a thorough understanding of the operational environment finally pushed key Japanese
civilian and military leaders to terminate the conflict on terms they once had
considered unimaginable. In the end, each side was just flexible enough to seek
a compromise, modifying their strategic objectives to set conditions for a better
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future. In doing so, hundreds of thousands of lives were spared. The occupation
of Japan began immediately, and Japan slowly began to rebuild from the ashes
of war. More importantly, the United States and Japan would develop a lasting relationship that has been a foundation of stability in the Pacific for almost
seventy-five years.
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